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Policy Brief

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Gavin Burn, Josiah Probst, & Quintin LeMire | Purdue University
HONR 399: Security, Technology, and Society | Spring 2021
Instructors: Dr. Dwaine Jengelley (Honors College) & Dr. L. Allison Roberts (PPRI)

Introduction
Since the first use of modern chemical weapons in World War I, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) have
improved drastically in lethality and longevity. These advances in weapons production, coupled with civilian
industries that can be rapidly converted to produce these weapons, provide a serious concern to the future of
global security. For these reasons, further action is needed by stakeholders, specifically the United Nations (UN)
and global superpowers, to curtail the development, proliferation, and WMDs utilization, for both domestic and
international peace and prosperity. Following are two ways the future security of WMDs can be addressed by
the aforementioned stakeholders:
• Maintain status quo with current treaties and preventive measures
• Revamp arms treaties and ensure there are consequences for violations
Each of these issues is described and discussed in this brief. To understand the gravity of the policy decisions
that must be made in regard to WMDs, we present a brief background, WMDs’ risks and benefits, maintaining
the status quo of WMD policy, and offer policy alternatives and recommendations.

Scope of the Problem
Today, certain WMDs are easier to obtain than ever. Unlike nuclear weapons, which
require significant investment and knowledge to be created, Chemical and
Biological WMDs can easily be made by repurposing civilian facilities [1].
Consequently, these two WMDs can deliver serious damage to both the
personnel caught in the weapons deployment and the environment
[1]. As the use of these weapons increases, namely by developing
nations and non-state actors, we must determine what
countermeasures must be taken to deter this erroneous
behavior, because there will continue to be threats in the
future.
Among the history of WMDs use, international treaties and
protocols leading to the limitation of testing and usage have
followed, which many nations follow extensively.
Organizations created through the United Nations Office of
Disarmament Affairs or by national entities have achieved the
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safe disposal of many of the world's WMDs.
Additionally, meetings with other WMDs users
created agreements on limitations towards the
deadliest weapons in the world [2].
Despite these advancements, there are still
problems related to WMDs. While most nations
adhere to the documents banning WMDs use on
the battlefield, some nations do not abide by
these conventions and further increase and
sophisticate their stockpiles [3]. This disregard
for the law, coupled with production of WMDs,
has led to use of such weapons via terrorist
attacks and by rogue, developing nations, with
few consequences for the violators.

Risks and Benefits
The risks posed by these weapons remain
extensive. All three forms of WMDs lay in the
surrounding areas of effect for long periods of
time, affecting both the civilian populace inside
of the area and in the environment, in some
cases causing irreparable damage to the
ecosystem. These problems, in turn, cause
economic and political difficulties for the nations
affected by these weapons.
While the risks of WMDs in the world are high,
WMDs also have some level of benefit. With
close monitoring and control of WMD arsenals
worldwide, they have served as a dissuasion
from further large scale or worldwide conflicts,
as the threat of mutually assured destruction has
influenced many powerful nations. Possession of
these weapons allows smaller nation-states to
have more authority internationally and given
them bargaining power to prevent larger nations
from political or military imposition.
The ethics of using WMDs remain fiercely
debated, as examples show long lasting effects
that came from their destructive powers.
Furthermore, most nations wish to liberate the
world of such weapons as a means to ensure

protection to both civilians and the environment
alike [2]. Unfortunately, most nations who
possess a WMD do not wish to rid themselves of
the weapon, for a plethora of reasons, such as
politically or for security. Fortunately, the
utilization of these weapons has happened only
a few times, and treaties and retaliation fears
have driven wielders to keep the weapons on
standby.
WMDs retain an immense cost for the upkeep
and maintenance required to maintain optimal
use [4]. The funds for upkeep of such weapons
can put serious strain on nations with limited
capacities in place. Moreover, containment
breaches of the material in WMDs have shown
to cause more serious consequences than the
usage of the weapons themselves [5]. The
majority
of
these
consequences
are
environmentally and economically challenging,
as civilian displacement and decontamination of
the impacted area is expensive, while seriously
detrimental to the wildlife surrounding the areas
[6].
In order to curtail the destruction of both lives
and land areas, more interventions and
inspections of nations is required. Inspections of
all nations’ facilities with the capacity to create
WMDs should be done without question or
hindrance for the betterment of society, and
reports should be open on what nations control
which WMDs. Interventions for WMD
deterrence, such as harsh economic sanctions
and possible international ultimatums, may be
needed to stop rogue actors.

Current Policy: Maintaining the
Status Quo
Currently, there is the option to maintain
existing levels of WMD security and monitoring.
There has been very limited WMD usage in
conflict and none between major superpowers
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in a large-scale conflict. In addition, proliferation
of WMDs is very low due to vigilant security of
stockpiles and the secrets that could lead to
weapons creation. Overall, the status quo may
be the best way to address WMD security in the
future because it has worked, and the
international community is familiar with the
current guidelines.

Chemical Weapons
Chemical weapons’ current policy is more than
adequate for eliminating stockpiles. The
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1993
called for and led to the elimination of chemical
weapons from most nation’s stockpiles. The
United States is the only country which has
complied and still is in the process of dismantling
their remaining chemical weapons. However,
some nations, such as Syria, do not offer full
transparency into their arsenal and are assumed
to have chemical weapons [7]. Guidelines stated
at the CWC should be applied more rigorously to
Syria and other nations in order to ensure
complete compliance.

Biological Weapons
Biological weapons are also banned from
nations’ arsenals. However, current policy allows
for countries to continue researching biological
weapons to counter any potential attacks,
whether from another enemy nation or a
terrorist group. Similar to chemical weapons,
biological weapons have not been used by a
nation in conflict for a long time and are almost
exclusively weapons of terrorist groups or rogue
nations [8]. Current standards appear effective
for keeping biological weapons off the battlefield
and in the lab, for now as well as in the future.

Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear weapons are highly debated due to their
destructive power and use in real conflict (as

compared to other WMDs.) There are a number
of policies and treaties which attempt to limit
nuclear arsenals and their continued
proliferation. The United Nations has many laws
which are largely symbolic, but the United States
and Russia have the Strategic Arms Reduction
Talks (START) treaty, which reduced the two
nations’ nuclear arsenals since the end of the
Cold War [9]. Other nations, such as India and
Pakistan, have treaties. While agreements may
not be as comprehensive and all-encompassing
for completely removing nuclear weapons,
nuclear weapons have not been used during war
since 1945.

Policy Alternatives and
Recommendation
While current policies have prevented recent
use and proliferation of WMDs by major powers,
the global situation is constantly evolving.
Chemical weapons were used by some nations in
smaller conflicts and on their own people [10],
biologicals can potentially be weaponized by
nations studying their effects, and nuclear
weapon treaties are not effective or consistent
enough to apply to every nation. Because of
these issues, there must be some change and
evolution in the policies that govern WMDs to
preserve security of countries around the world.
Current policy needs to be granted more
support, making the enforcement more
effective. The Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) should have greater
authority to go into countries to examine their
stockpiles and current chemical weapon
research. This examination would prevent rogue
nations from secretly building stockpiles and
using WMDs on their citizens or adversaries.
Greater transparency should also be applied to
biological weapons research. While countries
need research programs to counteract potential
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attacks, an independent commission should be
able to examine each country’s program to
ensure no research into weaponizing is
occurring. Lastly, nuclear treaties need to have
greater enforcement. Current UN laws have little
to no backing and punishment for violating
treaties has no power. With China, North Korea,
and Iran increasing their nuclear arsenals,
sanctions should be imposed for not complying
with weapons limitations as well as any
proliferation of secrets or technology.

Conclusion
Usage of WMDs leads to unimaginable and
horrifying
consequences,
especially
as
technology continues to develop the weapons’
lethality. Whether it is the environment,
economic, or societal costs, the destruction
caused is astronomical. For these reasons, it
should be in the interest of all nations to enforce
limitations on possessors of WMDs, inspections
towards all nations for any possible violations of
international agreements towards WMDs, and
serious repercussions for rule violators. This can
be done by giving the United Nations more
power and resources to combat rogue actors and
thwart any possible use of these weapons.
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